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LAWYERS AND THE ADMINISTRATIVE STATE 
Melissa Mortazavi* 
 
The institutional structure where federal government lawyers practice is 
fraught with political and economic pressures that undermine the ability of 
lawyers to exercise independent professional judgment.  A lack of candid 
legal advice in this space not only removes a pivotal fail-safe between legal 
and illegal state action but also precariously imbalances the powerful 
administrative state, exposing it to undue political influence.  For these 
reasons, this Article argues that structural changes to administrative 
institutions must be made to support and nurture lawyers’ ability to 
independently determine the bounds of legality. 
Previous scholarship has examined the role of professional independence 
for lawyers generally; however, the legal academy has yet to explore the 
centrality of professional independence to administrative law or the 
structural pressures influencing its exercise.  This Article joins a body of 
work that adopts a new institutionalist approach to professional misconduct.  
In doing so, this Article makes three principal contributions:  (1) it outlines 
why institutionally sustained professional independence is essential to the 
federal administrative state; (2) it identifies institutional failings that impede 
government lawyers’ exercise of professional independent judgment; and 
(3) it proposes institution-based solutions to facilitate professionally 
independent conduct by government lawyers.  By insulating government 
lawyers from excessive interference on core professional judgment calls, 
civil society may rely on these lawyers to help protect the basic structure of 
the rule of law. 
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INTRODUCTION 
When the basic pillars of democratic governance (the free press, the 
integrity of courts, the openness and reliability of elections, and even the 
evenhanded enforcement of laws) are attacked, the government lawyer is the 
primary, and at times the only, line of defense.  To fill this role, she must be 
a civil servant, an expert, and always a legal professional who wields 
independent judgment over her field of autonomy.1 
Independent judgment is easily marred.  A civil servant’s independent 
judgment is predicated on institutions that allow and facilitate independence.  
Already-weak existing supportive norms are further destabilized when 
executive branch leaders fire employees, remove longstanding job 
protections, and attack prominent government lawyers for carrying out their 
 
 1. At a minimum, this entails decoding what the law requires.  I note here that this Article 
takes a very limited, lowest-common-denominator view of professional independence in 
government practice and recognizes that the topic of what constitutes professional 
independence is itself a point of substantial attention. See, e.g., Norman W. Spaulding, 
Professional Independence in the Office of the Attorney General, 60 STAN. L. REV. 1931, 1934 
(2008) (exploring professional independence as self-reliance and personal detachment, and 
how rigid detachment may be tempered by discipline).  For the purposes of this Article, when 
I refer to professional independence, I am referring only to those aspects of professional 
independence that are least in dispute:  freedom from undue influence in discerning whether 
the goal set by the client (agency, agency head, executive, or the public) is legal, and if so, 
whether the means sought to attain that goal are legal. 
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professional duties.2  Such actions privilege loyalty to those currently in 
office over both expertise and commitment to an agency’s statutory mandate.  
This partisan crucible removes an important internal check on uninformed or 
illegal action by compromising the lawyer-client relationship and a lawyer’s 
function as an independent adviser and evaluator of law. 
Although scholars have commented on the role of professional 
independence for lawyers generally, the legal academy has yet to fully 
explore the centrality of professional independence in administrative law or 
the structural pressures influencing its exercise.  Instead, the law governing 
lawyer conduct continues to focus on the failures of individual lawyers to act 
in accordance with codified expectations of professional independence.3  
This Article joins a body of work that adopts an institutionalist approach to 
professional misconduct.4  This school posits that the norms and context of 
legal practice can either support or undermine ethical action.5  Consequently, 
the opportunity to address ethical problems does not lie in increasing 
individual accountability (at least not on its own) but, rather, in altering 
institutions.6  Thus, if society values the work of government lawyers, 
 
 2. Lisa Rein, Trump’s Fight with Federal Employee Unions Gets Real on Monday, 
WASH. POST (July 8, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/trumps-fight-with-
federal-employee-unions-gets-real-on-monday/2018/07/08/55e52e9e-7bba-11e8-aeee-4d04c 
8ac6158_story.html [https://perma.cc/P6W9-DBLR] (covering the presidential order to 
reopen collective bargaining with federal employees to negotiate terms that would lessen 
union activity and make discharge of employees more expedient); Noam Scheiber, Trump’s 
Power to Fire Federal Workers Curtailed by Judge, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 25, 2018), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/08/25/business/trump-federal-workers-unions.html 
[https://perma.cc/EJ6H-QL2X] (reporting that a district court struck down provisions of an 
executive order that would have allowed federal employees to be fired more easily). 
 3. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.2, 5.4 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2016). 
 4. This Article is not the first to explore the institutional conditions that would support 
professional conduct. See, e.g., Benjamin H. Barton, An Institutional Analysis of Lawyer 
Regulation:  Who Should Control Lawyer Regulation—Courts, Legislatures, or the Market?, 
37 GA. L. REV. 1167, 1175 (2003) (suggesting more active participation by legislatures in 
setting professional norms); Robert W. Gordon, The Independence of Lawyers, 68 B.U. L. 
REV. 1, 33–38 (1988) (listing nine factors that may impact institutions of professional 
independence, including strong norms, organization of practice, market position, and client 
relationships); Ted Schneyer, On Further Reflection:  How “Professional Self-Regulation” 
Should Promote Compliance with Broad Ethical Duties of Law Firm Management, 53 ARIZ. 
L. REV. 577, 585 (2011) (discussing the creation of “ethical infrastructures” in law firms to 
support desired lawyer conduct).  However, this Article looks specifically at the 
administrative-government context and takes a closer and more current look at the issue as it 
pertains to professional independence. 
 5. Melissa Mortazavi, Lawyers, Not Widgets:  Why Private-Sector Attorneys Must 
Unionize to Save the Legal Profession, 96 MINN. L. REV. 1482, 1484–85 (2012) (arguing that 
law firm institutional structure must be altered to change ethical norms of practice). 
 6. There is also a live debate over whether government lawyers owe a general duty to 
the public interest that supersedes their duty to an agency or administration. See Berger v. 
United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935) (stating that the duty of prosecutors is owed to the 
public:  “The United States Attorney is the representative not of an ordinary party to a 
controversy, but of a sovereignty whose obligation to govern impartially is as compelling as 
its obligation to govern at all; and whose interest, therefore, in a criminal prosecution is not 
that it shall win a case, but that justice shall be done.”); W. Bradley Wendel, Government 
Lawyers in the Trump Administration, 69 HASTINGS L.J. 275, 294 (2017) (describing the 
debate regarding the duty government lawyers hold to the public).  This Article does not 
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institutional structures in the government must support professional 
independence. 
It is worth noting that this Article does not use the term “institution” to 
refer purely to traditional physical places and finite groups of actors.  Rather, 
in its discussion of institutions, this Article adopts a new institutionalism 
perspective.  New institutionalism understands institutions as fluid sets of 
rules derived from “routines, procedures, conventions, roles, strategies, 
organizational forms, and technologies.”7  This analytical framework argues 
that behavioral patterns structure conscious decision-making and provide a 
different framework for understanding the work of actors in complex 
institutional settings.8  Institutions so described command adherence through 
hierarchies, sanctions, rewards, procedures, and rules.9 
Focusing exclusively on federal government lawyers, this Article makes 
three principal contributions:  (1) it outlines why institutionally sustained 
professional independence is essential to the federal administrative state; 
(2) it identifies institutional failings that impede government lawyers’ 
exercise of professional independent judgment; and (3) it proposes 
institution-based solutions to facilitate professionally independent conduct 
by government lawyers.  By insulating government lawyers from undue 
interference on core professional judgment calls, civil society may rely on 
these lawyers to help protect the basic structure of the rule of law. 
I.  PROFESSIONAL INDEPENDENCE, GOVERNMENT LAWYERING, 
AND BUREAUCRATIC EXPERTISE 
This Part outlines the centrality of independent judgment to a government 
lawyer’s professional duties and obligations.  It begins with a general point:  
threshold legal inquiries made at the outset of any representation, including 
candid assessment of the law, constitute the bedrock of a lawyer’s function.  
 
engage that question directly.  Rather, it focuses on making clear why professional 
independence for lawyers is valuable and important in the government context, and it 
presumes that democratic institutions and the rule of law are to the benefit of either of these 
potential “clients.”  It is also worth noting that under either paradigm, professional legal norms 
are in tension:  either the nonlawyer government officials who supervise lawyers place those 
lawyers in breach of prohibitions on nonlawyers controlling their professional independence, 
or nonlawyer government officials are viewed as clients (on behalf of the agency as an entity) 
and therefore can control the ends of the representation, but not the means. See MODEL RULES 
OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.2, 5.4 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2016). 
 7. JAMES G. MARCH & JOHAN P. OLSON, REDISCOVERING INSTITUTIONS:  THE 
ORGANIZATIONAL BASIS OF POLITICS 22 (1989); see also Paul J. DiMaggio & Walter W. 
Powell, Introduction to THE NEW INSTITUTIONALISM IN ORGANIZATIONAL ANALYSIS 1, 1–3 
(Walter W. Powell & Paul J. DiMaggio eds., 1991). 
 8. WENDELL GORDON, INSTITUTIONAL ECONOMICS:  THE CHANGING SYSTEM 16 (1980) 
(“[A]n institution is a grouping of people with some common behavior patterns, its members 
having an awareness of the grouping. . . .  It is not especially helpful to reify institutions in the 
sense of thinking of them as buildings or groups of people. . . .  So, the essence of the 
institution is the commonly held behavior pattern.”). 
 9. Thomas A. Koelble, The New Institutionalism in Political Science and Sociology, 27 
COMP. POL. 231, 233 (1995) (book review) (describing enforcement mechanisms in new 
institutional structures). 
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Part I asserts that independence is particularly warranted in the administrative 
context for two reasons:  to preserve (1) meaningful balances of power in 
administrative governance, and (2) the ability of administrative action to 
withstand judicial review. 
A.  Threshold Inquiries in Lawyering 
Professional independence is an accepted and central aspect of a lawyer’s 
professional identity, regardless of the context within which a lawyer 
practices.  Legal academics have long debated the boundaries and importance 
of professional independence, but it is a question of extent rather than 
inclusion.10  Some argue that independence from clients is less important 
than independence from the judiciary,11 while others argue that a lawyer must 
maintain independence from clients, their own interests, and the interests of 
the state.12  Tied to ideas gleaned from Alexis de Tocqueville, these 
conceptions of professional independence defend it in terms of creating a 
separate estate in society that would moderate abusive executives and 
populist groupthink.13  Others have been more utilitarian and have argued 
that role differentiation (and with it, independence not only from the 
influence of others, but from the self and moral conviction) leads to an 
advantageous prudential independence that supports more effective 
advocacy.14 
These different rationales converge around a baseline understanding:  
professional independence is an essential characteristic of lawyering because 
it increases objectivity and fairness by setting limits to layperson or economic 
 
 10. See, e.g., Louis Brandeis, The Opportunity in the Law, reprinted in BUSINESS—A 
PROFESSION 313, 321 (1933) (framing the ideal role of lawyers as being in “a position of 
independence, between the wealthy and the people, prepared to curb the excesses of either”). 
 11. Evan A. Davis, The Meaning of Professional Independence, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 
1281, 1281 (2003) (“[T]he ethical rules for protecting the professional independence of the 
bar need to take into account the role of the legal profession as an independent bulwark 
between individuals or organizations and the political branches of government.”); Gordon, 
supra note 4, at 7–9 (discussing a taxonomy of types of independence, including independence 
from the state or from clients, and independence as a political force); Bruce A. Green, 
Lawyers’ Professional Independence:  Overrated or Undervalued?, 46 AKRON L. REV. 599, 
602 (2013) (noting the importance of lawyers being independent from the judiciary in order 
to criticize judges, disobey unlawful orders, and resolve issues of professional conscience 
without undue interference). 
 12. See Susanna M. Kim, Dual Identities and Dueling Obligations:  Preserving 
Independence in Corporate Representation, 68 TENN. L. REV. 179, 185–87 (2000) (discussing 
professional independence from coercive client expectations); Peter Margulies, Lawyers’ 
Independence and Collective Illegality in Government and Corporate Misconduct, Terrorism, 
and Organized Crime, 58 RUTGERS L. REV. 939, 981 (2006) (arguing that the term 
“independence” carries with it very little meaning). 
 13. Gordon, supra note 4, at 14 (“In the republican vocabulary, independence from the 
dominant factions of civil society was the essential precondition to the ‘civic virtue’ or ‘patriot 
capacity’ that lawyers needed to perform these functions.”). 
 14. Norman W. Spaulding, The Rule of Law in Action:  A Defense of Adversary System 
Values, 93 CORNELL L. REV. 1377, 1399 (2008) (defending the virtues of role differentiation 
as providing systemic benefits, including emotional detachment and objectivity). 
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influence.15  Essentially, only from a position of professional independence 
can a lawyer aspire to determine what the law says and thereby make the 
essential minimal threshold determinations necessary for effective and 
ethical representation.  The division of client and lawyer autonomy 
recognizes clients’ rights to determine the goals of representation and charges 
lawyers to devise means to attain that goal.16  It bifurcates power in a way 
that, when combined with the power of courts and third parties, balances the 
needs of the client, the power of the state, and the role of the justice system 
in a dynamic equilibrium. 
However, the autonomy of lawyers, clients, and the court as conceived in 
the law regulating lawyer conduct is bound by finite constraints.17  A 
representation of a client must begin with two threshold inquiries:  First, is 
the client’s goal legal?  Second, what are the legally permissible means to 
attain the client’s goals?  Lawyers may not aid clients in pursuing an illegal 
goal.18  They also may not try to attain the client’s goals by using illegal 
means.19  The client’s interests must be harmonized with what is legal:  “At 
the barest minimum lawyers have to translate clients’ desires into something 
that can be processed by the legal system, and investigate the various ways 
in which legal officials might, in turn, process them.”20  The accurate 
resolution of both questions is predicated on the independent, objective 
application of specialized knowledge and expertise to the specific facts of the 
representation at hand.  It is this raw baseline that this Article adopts. 
B.  Independent Judgment and Lawyering 
Regardless of whether the legal academy has fully embraced the value and 
scope of professional independence, the American Bar Association (ABA) 
Model Rules of Professional Conduct show a substantive commitment to 
 
 15. In his landmark work on professionalism, Eliot Freidson discusses specialized 
knowledge in conjunction with self-regulation as necessary elements of a professional 
identity, with self-regulation acting as a mechanism by which a profession may exercise its 
unencumbered expertise and preserve its independence. ELIOT FREIDSON, PROFESSIONALISM:  
THE THIRD LOGIC 17 (2001) (“[P]rofessionalism is a set of institutions which permit the 
members of an occupation to make a living while controlling their own work.  It cannot exist 
unless it is believed that the particular tasks they perform are so different from those of most 
workers that self-control is essential.” (footnote omitted)). 
 16. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.2(a) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2016). 
 17. Gordon, supra note 4, at 10 (“Everyone concedes that even the most zealous advocate 
must remain within the framework of professional ethical rules and the ‘law.’”). 
 18. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.2(d) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2016) (“A lawyer shall 
not counsel a client to engage, or assist a client, in conduct the lawyer knows is criminal or 
fraudulent.”). Model Rule 1.2, Comment 1, states that the rule “confers upon the client the 
ultimate authority to determine the purposes to be served by legal representation, within limits 
imposed by law.” Id. r. 1.2 cmt. 1. 
 19. Id. r. 1.16 cmt. 2 (“A lawyer ordinarily must decline or withdraw from representation 
if the client demands that the lawyer engage in conduct that is illegal or violates the Rules of 
Professional Conduct or other law.”); see also Nix v. Whiteside, 475 U.S. 157, 173 (1986) 
(noting that, even in the criminal context, clients do not have a right to engage in criminal 
action, in this case, perjury). 
 20. Gordon, supra note 4, at 73. 
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independent judgment as a core lawyerly value.21  The preamble to the ABA 
Model Rules notes that “[s]elf-regulation also helps maintain the legal 
profession’s independence from government domination.”22  Self-regulation 
is justified in terms of creating the necessary conditions for the exercise of 
professional independence.23 
More specific charges to protect professional independence are peppered 
throughout the Model Rules.  For example, Model Rule 1.2 requires only that 
a lawyer “consult” with a client about the means of attaining client goals, not 
that they abide by a client’s view.24  The rule governing third-party payment 
of lawyers’ fees considers lawyer autonomy separate from client relations 
and insists that such payment may only be accepted where “there is no 
interference with the lawyer’s independence of professional judgment or 
with the client-lawyer relationship.”25 
The rules regarding the lawyer’s role as advisor make it imperative that, 
“[i]n representing a client, a lawyer shall exercise independent professional 
judgment and render candid advice.”26  The comments to these rules go on 
to elucidate that a lawyer must discuss her “honest assessment” even where 
“unpleasant.”27  In these situations, “a lawyer should not be deterred from 
giving candid advice by the prospect that the advice will be unpalatable to 
the client.”28  The commitment to professional independence culminates in 
ABA Model Rule 5.4, which prohibits a lawyer from sharing lawyer’s fees 
with a nonlawyer or engaging in a partnership that includes law practice with 
a nonlawyer.29  The justification for these limitations is to “protect the 
lawyer’s professional independence of judgment.”30  The Model Rule goes 
on to prohibit practicing “with or in the form of a professional corporation or 
association authorized to practice law for a profit where . . . a non-lawyer has 
the right to direct or control the professional judgment of a lawyer.”31 
A growing chorus of scholars and practitioners have called attention to the 
potential benefits of nonlawyer ownership of law practices, including 
increased access to justice, superior client service, and broader market 
power.32  Despite indicators in other common-law jurisdictions, such as the 
 
 21. See Wendel, supra note 6, at 282 (arguing that the need to provide objective legal 
advice is not “aspirational . . . [but a] basic, mandatory obligation[] for all lawyers”). 
 22. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT pmbl. (AM. BAR ASS’N 2016). 
 23. See Green, supra note 11, at 604. 
 24. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.2 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2016). 
 25. Id. r. 1.8(f)(2). 
 26. Id. r. 2.1. 
 27. Id. r. 2.1 cmt. 1. 
 28. Id. 
 29. Id. r. 5.4(a)–(b). 
 30. Id. r. 5.4 cmt. 1. 
 31. Id. r. 5.4(d)(3). 
 32. Gillian K. Hadfield, Legal Barriers to Innovation:  The Growing Economic Cost of 
Professional Control over Corporate Legal Markets, 60 STAN. L. REV. 1689, 1709–11 (2008) 
(arguing in favor of nonlawyers providing legal services); Renee Newman Knake, 
Democratizing the Delivery of Legal Services, 73 OHIO ST. L.J. 1, 10–11 (2012) (arguing that 
nonlawyer ownership would increase access to civil remedies); Cassandra Burke Robertson, 
Private Ordering in the Market for Professional Services, 94 B.U. L. REV. 179, 179–80 (2014) 
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United Kingdom, that opening up the legal-services market to nonlawyers 
may have some social benefits, the ABA has reiterated its commitment to 
excluding laypeople from partnerships with lawyers.33  This demonstrates at 
minimum a strong facial commitment to maintaining lawyer autonomy from 
layperson control, despite potential benefits. 
C.  Lawyers in the Administrative State 
While independent judgment is a universally important element of the 
professional conduct of lawyers, it carries even greater weight in the context 
of the federal government, where lawyers play an integral part in our modern 
system of administrative law. There, professional independence critically 
supports effective administrative action and balanced power structures within 
the American system of governance.  Professional independence also 
justifies administrative power in traditional terms, adding both expertise and 
bureaucratic neutrality. 
Given the power of the state, legal missteps can have massive 
consequences.34  Moreover, civil servants and elected officials rely heavily 
on government lawyers’ pronouncements of law.  Lawyers channel state 
power, set work parameters for federal employees, and can act as the final 
bulwark between illegal action and the breakdown of legal institutions.35  As 
such, their independence is much more than a conceptual nicety; it is a critical 
player in administrative action being accurate, surviving judicial review, and 
retaining the legitimacy that is derived from party neutrality.  The loss of that 
claim to neutrality can render agency action improper in the eyes of the public 
and the courts.36 
The independence of government lawyers to provide expertise-based 
advice has two distinct advantages in the context of administrative agencies.  
First, lawyers provide legal guidance to the civil service, enabling it to play 
a necessary role in a delicate balance of power with political actors.  Second, 
professionally independent legal advice fulfills process requirements that 
allow agency action to withstand judicial scrutiny on review.  The following, 
Part I.C.1, sketches out the particular role independent lawyers play in 
supporting a healthy balance of power within the administrative state.  Part 
 
(contending that barriers to nonlawyer ownership increase inequity and are unconstitutional); 
Nick Robinson, When Lawyers Don’t Get All the Profits:  Non-Lawyer Ownership, Access, 
and Professionalism, 29 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 1, 15–16 (2016). 
 33. See Alison Frankel, Lawyers Remain Deeply Skeptical of Non-Lawyers Investing in 
Law Firms, REUTERS (May 9, 2016), http://blogs.reuters.com/alison-frankel/2016/05/09/ 
lawyers-remain-deeply-skeptical-of-non-lawyers-investing-in-law-firms/ [https://perma.cc/ 
6AU3-8MFN]. 
 34. See infra Part II.D; see also Andrew Cohen, The Torture Memos, 10 Years Later, 
ATLANTIC (Feb. 6, 2012), https://www.theatlantic.com/national/archive/2012/02/the-torture-
memos-10-years-later/252439/ [https://perma.cc/MLJ9-FTQJ]. 
 35. See, e.g., Cary Coglianese, The Internet and Citizen Participation in Rulemaking, 
1 I/S 33, 36 (2005) (discussing how civil servants draft, analyze, and design policy). 
 36. Eric Lipton & David Johnston, Gonzales’s Critics See Lasting, Improper Ties to White 
House, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 15, 2007), https://www.nytimes.com/2007/03/15/washington/ 
15justice.html [https://perma.cc/JTP9-C9Z6]. 
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I.C.2 examines how agency lawyers’ professional independence interacts 
with judicial review of agency action. 
1.  Balance of Power 
Traditionally, scholars have understood constitutional separation of 
powers between the legislative, judicial, and executive branches as the 
primary limiting agent on administrative power.37  However, more recent 
scholarship suggests that the true force moderating administrative action is 
not these three branches externally vying for influence but a dynamic 
equilibrium between regulatory rivals within administrative agencies.38  In 
this paradigm, it is the tension and interplay between different actors within 
the administrative state that are responsible for tempering administrative 
abuses of power.39  Such focus on intra-agency separation of powers 
facilitates interplay between political, technocratic, and legalistic norms.  In 
a “self-regulating administrative ecosystem,”40 normative concerns are 
addressed by maintaining the delicate balance between the relative power of 
political appointees, civil servants, and the public.41  Understood in this way, 
all civil servants are meant to have unmediated allegiances directly to law 




 37. See, e.g., Jonathan R. Macey, Organizational Design and Political Control of 
Administrative Agencies, 8 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 93, 93–94 (1992); Elizabeth Magill & Adrian 
Vermeule, Allocating Power Within Agencies, 120 YALE L.J. 1032, 1035 (2011) (“Perhaps the 
main topic in administrative law is the allocation of power among legislatures, courts, the 
President, and various types of agencies.”). 
 38. See, e.g., Neal Kumar Katyal, Internal Separation of Powers:  Checking Today’s Most 
Dangerous Branch from Within, 115 YALE L.J. 2314, 2316–17 (2006); Gillian E. Metzger, 
The Interdependent Relationship Between Internal and External Separation of Powers, 59 
EMORY L.J. 423, 424–25 (2010). 
 39. Magill & Vermeule, supra note 37, at 1035. 
 40. Jon D. Michaels, Of Constitutional Custodians and Regulatory Rivals:  An Account 
of the Old and New Separation of Powers, 91 N.Y.U. L. REV. 227, 231 (2016). 
 41. Jon D. Michaels, An Enduring, Evolving Separation of Powers, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 
515, 529–70 (2015) (discussing the concept of a tripartite administrative power system). 
 42. 5 U.S.C. § 3331 (2012) (setting forth the civil service oath of office:  “I, AB, do 
solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will support and defend the Constitution of the United States 
against all enemies, foreign and domestic; that I will bear true faith and allegiance to the same; 
that I take this obligation freely, without any mental reservation or purpose of evasion; and 
that I will well and faithfully discharge the duties of the office on which I am about to enter.”). 
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Figure 1:  Administrative Power43 
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Within this tripartite system, lawyers may populate the realm of political 
appointees or act as members of public civil society, but, most 
consequentially, they serve as civil servants (in constitutional terms, “inferior 
officers”).  In these positions, government lawyers enforce, prosecute, 
adjudicate, make rules, and create barriers and boundaries for other civil 
servants by interpreting legality.  Often, these lawyers provide a 
counterweight to raw political power and public will. 
Dependence on independent professional assessment of legality 
differentiates civil servants from political appointees.  This separation is 
integral to a government lawyer’s role as a shepherd to the civil servant 
branch of the administrative apparatus.  By both “inclination and training,” 
civil servants “often feel bound by legal, moral, or professional norms to 
certain courses of action.”44  Lawyers guide civil servants in understanding 
the legal parameters of their duties.45  However, the weight of lawyers’ 
advice is contingent on it being viewed as free from political influence.  
Without clear guidance that is viewed as apolitical, civil servants are limited 
in the actions they will be willing to take.  Because civil servants “are 
committed to enforcing the governing statutory regime that sets out the 
parameters of their authority and regulatory responsibilities,” the importance 
of articulating legal authority for their actions is heightened as compared to 
political appointees, nongovernmental employees, or even the public.46  
Independent lawyering plays a critical role in supporting the civil service and, 
by extension, maintaining the administrative tripartite ecosystem of civil 
servants, political appointees, and the public. 
 
 43. See Michaels, supra note 41, at 529–70 (suggesting the concept of a tripartite system, 
as demonstrated in Figure 1). 
 44. See DAVID E. LEWIS, THE POLITICS OF PRESIDENTIAL APPOINTMENTS:  POLITICAL 
CONTROL AND BUREAUCRATIC PERFORMANCE 30 (2008). 
 45. Evan Osnos, Trump vs. the “Deep State,” NEW YORKER (May 21, 2018), 
https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2018/05/21/trump-vs-the-deep-state [http://perma.cc/ 
96W9-4B98] (discussing how civil servants traditionally view their role as very strictly 
bounded by law); see also Bill Chappell, “I Don’t Believe That Torture Works,” CIA Nominee 
Gina Haspel Tells Senators, NPR (May 9, 2018, 9:29 AM), https://www.npr.org/sections/ 
thetwo-way/2018/05/09/609681289/gina-haspel-confirmation-hearing-cia-nominee-faces-
senators-questions [https://perma.cc/8H2G-9ANR] (reporting Haspel justifying torture at CIA 
black sites because counsel had told her it was legal). 
 46. Metzger, supra note 38, at 445. 
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Such lawyers may also supply an additional check on power by moderating 
the influence of the client (whether the client is conceived of as the agency, 
the executive branch, or the public) through the lawyer-client relationship 
itself.  This suggests a model analogous to Professor Michaels’s account of 
limitations on administrative power as being a balance of power between 
three administratively internal factions.47  Similarly, here, the power of the 
law is moderated and limited by the triumvirate of client, lawyer, and court 
autonomy.  Spheres of autonomy are preserved not purely for the benefit of 
the lawyer or the client in any given situation, but for the benefit of reaching 
a balanced outcome, since no one side can complete the work alone.  Rather, 
clients control goals, lawyers lay out plans of attack, and courts set 
boundaries on both the actions of lawyers and clients to comport with the 
court’s understanding of legal requirements, rules of engagement, and 
professional conduct. 
Figure 2:  Power Vested in Law 
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Reliance on core lawyering norms and this diffused structure of legality 
may also inform Congress’s willingness to allocate power to the executive 
branch and administrative agencies in the first place.  Expecting that power 
yielded to the executive would be diffused by checks from lawyerly 
professional expertise and training, Congress can “justify or at least address 
concerns about the increase in power at the executive level.”48  As such, the 
law of lawyering, and particularly lawyer autonomy, becomes a precondition 
for power transfer, interwoven with the intrabranch power ecosystem.  In this 
paradigm, Congress never meant for the executive to have unchecked 
power—only power bounded by lawyers’ norms of professional conduct.49 
2.  Judicial Review and the Role of Expertise 
Moreover, lawyers’ professional independence also protects agency action 
from claims of invalidity on judicial review.  Here, the actions of lawyers fall 
under the greater umbrella of valid agency action designed to survive judical 
 
 47. Michaels, supra note 41, at 529–70. 
 48. Bruce Green & Rebecca Roiphe, Can the President Control the Department of 
Justice?, 70 ALA. L. REV. 1, 49 (2018).  “Prosecutorial independence has become a 
cornerstone of American democracy, built into the way the country is governed.” Id. at 4. 
 49. Id. at 49; see also Adrien Vermeule, Conventions of Agency Independence, 113 
COLUM. L. REV. 1163, 1201–03 (2013) (discussing how the structure of American government 
is interwoven with conceptions of prosecutorial independence). 
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scrutiny.  Whether tethered to the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) or in 
the context of statutory ambiguity govered by the standard set forth in 
Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.,50 the work 
of government lawyers, and agency action in general, is only entitled to 
deference on judicial review where it is not “arbitrary and capricious.”51 
Bureaucratic neutrality and expertise are key components of determining 
whether an agency action passes judicial review.52  In the seminal case Motor 
Vehicle Manufacturers Ass’n v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance 
Co.,53 the U.S. Supreme Court made clear that administrative action cannot 
be justified in purely political terms, but instead must be neutral, 
technocratic, and based in statutory law.54  To surpass the admittedly 
deferential arbitrary and capricious standard, the agency must “examine the 
relevant data and articulate a satisfactory explanation for [the agency’s] 
action, including a ‘rational connection between the facts found and the 
choice made.’”55  In doing so, the Court’s ruling in State Farm juxtaposes 
action that is purely political with rational action.56  In 2007, the Court 
reaffirmed this assertion in Massachusetts v. EPA,57 where it compelled the 
EPA to scientifically determine whether emissions endanger public health 
before the appellate court would recognize the agency’s action as complying 
with procedural requirements.58  By tying judicial deference to the agency’s 
exercise of expert judgment based in fact analysis, rather than exclusively on 
direct political pressure, the federal courts force expertise and bureaucratic 
 
 50. 467 U.S. 837 (1984). 
 51. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (2012) (stating that agency action is to be set aside where it is 
“arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law”); 
Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843 (inquiring into “whether the agency’s answer is based on a 
permissible construction of the statute”).  This Article acknowledges that arbitrary and 
capricious review pursuant to the APA can be treated as coterminous with the second step of 
the Chevron analysis. See, e.g., Nat’l Ass’n of Regulatory Util. Comm’rs v. Interstate 
Commerce Comm’n, 41 F.3d 721, 726 (D.C. Cir. 1994); Ronald M. Levin, The Anatomy of 
Chevron:  Step Two Reconsidered, 72 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1253, 1254 (1997). 
 52. Some scholars have advocated for more weight and consideration to be given to 
political actions.  This, however is not the law as it currently stands. See Kathryn A. Watts, 
Proposing a Place for Politics in Arbitrary and Capricious Review, 119 YALE L.J. 2, 7–9 
(2009). 
 53. 463 U.S. 29 (1983). 
 54. Id. at 47–57; Elena Kagan, Presidential Administration, 114 HARV. L. REV. 2245, 
2381 (2001) (describing how State Farm demanded that an agency “justify its decision in 
neutral, expertise-laden terms to the fullest extent possible”). 
 55. State Farm, 463 U.S. at 43 (quoting Burlington Truck Lines, Inc. v. United States, 
371 U.S. 156, 168 (1962)). 
 56. CHRISTOPHER F. EDLEY, JR., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW:  RETHINKING JUDICIAL CONTROL 
OF BUREAUCRACY 183 (1990) (noting that State Farm “entails a conception of politics as 
distinguishable from and in opposition to the required rationality of agency decision making”). 
 57. 549 U.S. 497 (2007). 
 58. Id. at 534–35.  Although the Court was not applying the APA, the applicable provision 
of the Clean Air Act closely hews to the APA’s, rendering them virtually coterminous. See 
42 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (2012) (calling for the reversal of agency action “found to be . . . 
arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law”).  But 
see FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 556 U.S. 502, 523 (2009) (plurality opinion) 
(permitting a shift in agency policy where the change was “spurred by significant political 
pressure from Congress” but also had factual support). 
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neutrality into a central position in agency function.59  This external judicial 
pressure may have the added benefit of producing better policy outcomes and 
increasing public confidence.60 
In rulemaking and adjudication, the procedural structure of administrative 
action will also award the work of government lawyers substantial deference 
where a full and robust record has been developed.61  The creation of a record 
and justification in terms that are evidence-based have long been necessary 
to create stable administrative policy, even where a partisan agenda pushed 
such policy change to the fore.62  The current presidential administration has 
made it a norm of practice to not keep notes or create records while engaging 
in many administrative functions.63  This is problematic for a government 
lawyer in two respects.  First, any lawyer who meets minimum professional 
requirements of diligence and competence must create records in the regular 
course of practice.64  Second, a government lawyer knows that the failure to 
create a record places the agency’s action in a vulnerable position on judicial 
review.  An insufficient or scant record is often responsible for a failure of 
agency action to withstand scrutiny by the court. 
II.  INSTITUTIONAL TENSIONS THAT UNDERMINE 
PROFESSIONAL INDEPENDENCE 
The previous Part laid out the importance of professional independence to 
lawyering with a focus on the unique context of federal administrative law.  
Part II identifies institutional structures in the current administrative system 
that fail to support robust (or, arguably, adequate) independent professional 
judgment.  Rather than focusing on the accountability of individual lawyers, 
which is of limited utility, this Article instead casts a spotlight on institutional 
risks that arise from current workplace structures as well as from a lack of a 
cohesive lawyer culture. 
 
 59. Jody Freeman & Adrian Vermeule, Massachusetts v. EPA:  From Politics to 
Expertise, 2007 SUP. CT. REV. 51, 52 (drawing attention to the Supreme Court’s opinions that 
set aside agency action where “executive expertise had been subordinated to politics”). 
 60. See STEPHEN BREYER, BREAKING THE VICIOUS CIRCLE:  TOWARD EFFECTIVE RISK 
REGULATION 55–56, 59–60 (1993) (“A depoliticized regulatory process might produce better 
results, hence increased confidence, leading to more favorable public and Congressional 
reactions.”). 
 61. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A), (E) (2012) (requiring evidentiary support for rulemaking).  
Under normal circumstances, the record on judicial review is limited to that considered by the 
administrative agency itself. Nev. Land Action Ass’n v. U.S. Forest Serv., 8 F.3d 713, 718 
(9th Cir. 1993). 
 62. United States v. Nova Scotia Food Prods. Corp., 568 F.2d 240, 249 (2d Cir. 1977) 
(insisting on the existence of an “adequate [administrative] record” to ensure “meaningful 
[judicial] review”). 
 63. This may not always be the preference for politically motivated actors thinking in the 
short term. See Osnos, supra note 45 (noting that “on controversial issues, the Administration 
is often not writing down potentially damaging information” and reporting that some felt the 
administration to be “deliberately avoiding creating records”). 
 64. See, e.g., MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.1, 1.3 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2016) 
(requiring “competence” and “diligence” in the practice of law). 
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A.  Reporting to Nonlawyers 
Traditionally, lawyers exert oversight over other lawyers.  Lawyers are 
uniquely well-situated to understand the expectations of practice and the 
parameters of law essential to the twin core inquiries regarding legality that 
underlie any attorney-client relationship.65  Thus, professional conduct, 
particularly independent professional conduct, is best fostered when lawyers 
are supervised by parties who are subject to the same professional 
expectations and norms. 
It is the longstanding recognition of the coercive imbalance of a work 
environment where the client is also the supervisor that animates the bar’s 
prohibition on nonlawyer ownership of legal practices.  The thought is that 
when nonlawyers control the work of lawyers, those nonlawyer supervisors 
are not guided by the same concepts of professional conduct or subject to the 
same state bar controls.66  Since the professional responsibility of lawyers 
includes a complex weighing of duties to the client and the court, as well as 
a multitude of other intricate concepts, laypersons may lack the ability to 
appreciate the boundaries of professional action. 
For a lawyer to exercise professionally independent judgment regarding 
the threshold questions that all lawyers must answer, lawyers need the 
autonomy to make those assessments without coercion.  However, pervasive 
agency culture, coupled with the particular policy mission of a given 
leadership regime, can create an environment in which lawyers will likely be 
hesitant, if not loath, to point out interpretations of law contravening policy 
objectives even where the failure to do so is a breach of their duties.  Since a 
nonlawyer supervisor is under no obligation to the bar, has not been 
immersed in the norms and customs of lawyering, and may feel no adherence 
to principles of limited advocacy (meaning advocacy limited by law), the 
likelihood of such pronouncements being respected is low in the first place. 
Moreover, a layperson is more likely to lack the ability to meaningfully 
review the quality of a lawyer’s work and may use outcome-oriented metrics 
to assess performance.  Any student of professional conduct knows that 
lawyers do not breach their professional duties by not reaching the outcome 
a client wants (including winning the case).  A lawyer breaches professional 
duties when the process of representation is compromised—when the lawyer 
has not been diligent, competent, or provided an independent professional 
opinion. 
Government lawyers practice in an environment where they are often 
supervised by laypeople and are subject to review by entities that oversee all 
employee misconduct and are not lawyer-oriented.  This adversely impacts 
the institutional context of practice by introducing norms of layperson 
employment, namely the expectation of compliance with supervisorial 
 
 65. See supra Part I.A. 
 66. 28 U.S.C. § 530B(a) (2012) (“[A]ttorney[s] for the Government shall be subject to 
State laws and rules, and local Federal court rules, governing attorneys in each State where 
such attorney engages in that attorney’s duties, to the same extent and in the same manner as 
other attorneys in that State.”). 
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direction, “loyalty” to mission as determined by supervisors, and limited 
autonomy for a party viewed as an employee. 
While the Department of Justice is headed by the Attorney General (a 
lawyer), many lawyers in government service answer directly to department 
heads or agency chiefs who are nonlawyers.67  This creates a fraught 
institutional structure for the attorney who must communicate to a person 
who is simultaneously her boss and her client.  The difference between a 
supervisor, who can control a lawyer’s decision-making, and a client, who 
has a limited field of autonomy, is a pivotal one.  Lawyers require a work 
environment where they have the independence to discern the legal 
parameters of the actions taken and the strategies legally applied.  It is in the 
space between the client’s right to choose the goal and the lawyer’s 
prerogative to discern the means of representation that lawyers must wield 
expertise that is not only to their client’s benefit, but also in conformance 
with the law. 
B.  Reporting to Political Appointees 
Whether supervisors are lawyers or not, the fact that agency heads are 
often subject to direct appointment and removal without cause creates 
institutionally conflicted motivations for lawyers.  Superior officers in 
executive agencies are subject to the appointment and removal powers of the 
president of the United States.68  As such, appointees are arguably more 
democratically accountable to the executive branch than the attorneys they 
supervise.  However, these appointees are also vulnerable.  Because the 
president can often remove them from their positions without cause, the 
pressure on appointees occupying these executive offices to engage in 
partisan activity is high. 
As current executive action makes clear, senior lawyers may often find 
themselves on the receiving end of harsh and unwanted pressure, and even 
employment action, for failure to respond to political pressure.69  History is 
littered with principled lawyers who resigned or were fired (or were not 
considered for positions in the first place) based on their commitments to a 
professionally independent assessment of legal requirements.70  Likewise, 
 
 67. It is worth noting that even the Attorney General, who heads the Department of 
Justice, and who thus far has always been a lawyer, is not required to be an attorney by law. 
28 U.S.C. § 503 (2012).  Still, normative custom is a significant part of institutions, perhaps 
even more so than positive assertions of values or goals. 
 68. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2. 
 69. See Elisha Fieldstadt, Trump Attacks Jeff Sessions:  “I Don’t Have an Attorney 
General,” NBC NEWS (Sept. 19, 2018), https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/donald-
trump/trump-attacks-jeff-sessions-i-don-t-have-attorney-general-n910986 [https://perma.cc/ 
33YE-T6FZ]; Tucker Higgins, Trump Attacks Justice Department Official Bruce Ohr, Putting 
Pressure on Attorney General Jeff Sessions to Fire Him, CNBC (Aug. 20, 2018), 
https://www.cnbc.com/2018/08/20/trump-pressures-jeff-sessions-to-fire-bruce-ohr-for-
murky-dossier-link.html [https://perma.cc/QNB5-CUBN]; see also 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(2) 
(2012). 
 70. See, e.g., Michael D. Shear & Matt Apuzzo, FBI Director James Comey Is Fired by 
Trump, N.Y. TIMES (May 9, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/05/09/us/politics/james-
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history also gives us examples of those who have bowed to the pressure and 
faced negative consequences as a result.71  It often appears that lawyers are 
the public scapegoat for poor executive policy choices:  damned if they do, 
and damned if they don’t.  However, this Article does not argue that lawyers 
as a group have been systematically unwilling to defend the rule of law or 
render candid judgments regarding legality.  Rather, it asks:  Why do the 
institutional structures in which they practice make it so hard for them to do 
so?  Why do we ask agency lawyers to give up their livelihoods instead of 
creating better avenues for redress? 
The Hatch Act, which prohibits garden-variety civil servants from 
engaging in partisan political activities,72 is Congress’s attempt to curtail the 
pressure on civil servants to “perform political chores in order to curry favor 
with their superiors.”73  This statute attempted to support the expectation that 
agency officials shall not request or consider a recommendation based on 
political connections or influence.74  In reality, however, these explicit 
prohibitions against political consideration do little to insulate civil servants 
who take an unpopular political view.75 
C.  The Role of the Inspector General 
In addition to direct in-office oversight by immediate supervisors subject 
to political pressure, all federal employees, including most lawyers, are 
subject to some review by that agency’s Office of the Inspector General.76  
Post-Watergate, Congress attempted to craft a system of internal agency 
 
comey-fired-fbi.html [https://perma.cc/428S-TL75]; Michael D. Shear et al., Trump Fires 
Acting Attorney General Who Defied Him, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 30, 2017), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/30/us/politics/trump-immigration-ban-memo.html 
[https://perma.cc/LS3Q-G3D9]. 
 71. Eric Lichtblau & Scott Shane, Gonzales, Loyal to Bush, Was Firm on War Policies, 
N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 28, 2007), https://www.nytimes.com/2007/08/28/washington/ 
28gonzales.html [https://perma.cc/XCR9-M9CX]; Kenneth Noble, Bork Irked by Emphasis 
on His Role in Watergate, N.Y. TIMES (July 2, 1987), https://www.nytimes.com/1987/07/02/ 
us/bork-irked-by-emphasis-on-his-role-in-watergate.html [https://perma.cc/2AC8-D2QS]. 
 72. Hatch Act of 1939, Pub. L. No. 76-252, 53 Stat. 1147 (codified at 5 U.S.C. §§ 7321–
7326 (2012)). 
 73. U.S. Civil Serv. Comm’n v. Nat’l Ass’n of Letter Carriers, 413 U.S. 548, 565–66 
(1973). 
 74. Id. 
 75. However, the Hatch Act does not begin to attack the problem of being “turkey-
farmed”—a term used in the civil service to describe the practice of using obscure, dead-end 
assignments as a way of punishing employees who are viewed as out of sync with the current 
administration. See, e.g., Osnos, supra note 45 (detailing how experts who are viewed as 
asking the wrong questions are sidelined or placed in jobs designed to demoralize them and 
encourage retirement). 
 76. After Watergate, Congress was concerned about executive overreach and, more 
generally, the misuse and abuse of government power. See Archibald Cox, Watergate and the 
Constitution of the United States, 26 U. TORONTO L.J. 126, 129 (1976); see also Philip 
Shabecoff, Presidency Is Found Weaker Under Ford, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 28, 1976), 
https://www.nytimes.com/1976/03/28/archives/presidency-is-found-weaker-under-ford-
curbs-on-exerting-power-seen.html [https://perma.cc/P7RJ-UWVH]. 
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accountability that culminated in the Inspector General Act of 1978.77  The 
Act mandates that each executive agency have an inspector general (IG) to 
oversee issues of employee fraud and abuse.78  The IG is frequently 
nominated and confirmed by the Senate and therefore has an independent 
status equivalent in many ways to the agency head, who the IG both reports 
to and oversees.79 
When the Act was first passed in 1978, Congress specifically deferred to 
the Department of Justice (DOJ) on how to apply IG oversight.80  Because 
of concerns about political interference and executive overreach in law 
enforcement, Congress explicitly exempted DOJ attorneys from IG 
investigations of professional misconduct and opted instead to place such 
investigative and disciplinary authority in the politically insulated Office of 
Professional Responsibility (OPR).81  The law requires that the IG refrain 
from investigating and refer to the OPR all “allegations of misconduct 
involving [DOJ] attorneys, investigators, or law enforcement personnel, 
where the allegations relate to the exercise of the authority of an attorney to 
investigate, litigate, or provide legal advice.”82  The OPR is headed by a 
counsel appointed by the Attorney General who reports directly to the 
Attorney General and the Deputy Attorney General.83 
 
 77. Brian Naylor, Inspecting for Trust:  The Role of Inspectors General, NPR (May 4, 
2010), https://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=126511407 [https://perma.cc/ 
N4JQ-6Z33]. 
 78. WENDY GINSBERG & MICHAEL GREEN, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R43814, FEDERAL 
INSPECTORS GENERAL:  HISTORY, CHARACTERISTICS, AND RECENT CONGRESSIONAL ACTIONS 1 
(2016), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R43814.pdf [https://perma.cc/MUR4-DAHY]. 
 79. Id. at 7. 
 80. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, B-256322, REPORT TO CHAIRMAN OF THE SENATE 
JUDICIARY COMMITTEE 2 (1994), http://www.gao.gov/assets/400/390452.pdf [http://perma.cc/ 
8GSK-DMUG] (recounting the history of government oversight legislation). 
 81. In pertinent part, the statute reads: 
In carrying out the duties and responsibilities specified in this Act, the Inspector 
General of the Department of Justice . . . shall refer to the Counsel, Office of 
Professional Responsibility of the Department of Justice, allegations of misconduct 
involving Department attorneys, investigators, or law enforcement personnel, where 
the allegations relate to the exercise of the authority of an attorney to investigate, 
litigate, or provide legal advice, except that no such referral shall be made if the 
attorney is employed in the Office of Professional Responsibility. 
5 U.S.C. app. § 8E(b)(3) (2016); see also 28 C.F.R. § 0.39a(4) (2017). 
 82. 5 U.S.C. app. § 8E(b)(3) (outlining special provisions concerning the Department of 
Justice).  Other agencies also have Offices of Professional Responsibility, but only the DOJ 
OPR enjoys a statutory exception from the general mandate of IG oversight.  These other 
offices cover much more than attorney misconduct and often act as advisory bodies that 
recommend positional punishments to the subjects of their investigations.  The Internal 
Revenue Service’s OPR reviews the work of lawyers and nonlawyers who appear before the 
IRS, but not allegations of internal misconduct. See Office of Professional Responsibility, IRS, 
https://www.irs.gov/tax-professionals/office-of-professional-responsibility [https://perma.cc/ 
LD85-AXPS] (last visited Mar. 15, 2019).  Immigration and Customs Enforcement’s OPR 
investigates employee misconduct and inspects detention facilities by delegation from the 
Department of Homeland Security’s IG office. See Office of Professional Responsibility 
(OPR), ICE, https://www.ice.gov/leadership/opr [https://perma.cc/7LGH-DTV8] (last visited 
Mar. 15, 2019). 
 83. 28 C.F.R. § 0.39a(a)(7)–(8). 
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While DOJ attorneys have some insulation from political pressure and 
nonlawyer oversight of professional judgment through OPR review, all other 
agency lawyers face investigation for both professional and generalized 
employee misconduct under the agency IG’s general oversight jurisdiction.84 
D.  Limited Supervisor Accountability 
Administrative law draws virtually no distinction between nonlawyers 
supervising lawyers as opposed to laypeople.  While supervisors face general 
oversight and potential discipline through the agency’s IG (particularly for 
actions taken against whistleblowers),85 there are insufficient mechanisms 
for subordinate lawyers to seek redress for interference with candid 
assessments of legal requirements.  If a lawyer is supervising, they are likely 
to be subject to direct review by a political appointee if the supervisor is not 
a political appointee herself.  If nonlawyers are given supervisory power over 
lawyers, as they are in many agencies, then they have no requirements to be 
trained in or aware of the professional requirements placed on lawyers under 
their charge.  Once again, the burden is placed on the individual person, the 
subordinate, who is unfortunate enough to be both lawyer and employee—a 
position that is suboptimal at best. 
E.  Limited OPR Effectiveness 
Even when the OPR has had oversight over lawyer conduct and has 
condemned a lack of independent professional judgment, narrow 
interpretations of the scope of the office’s disciplinary power have impeded 
the ability of the OPR to be effective.  A recent and vivid example of this is 
the OPR’s finding that John Yoo and Jay Bybee’s Office of Legal Counsel 
memos, which attempted to legally justify torture, violated professional 
conduct rules requiring “thorough, objective, and candid” legal analysis.86  
One could argue that this finding comported with the profession’s 
generalized self-regulatory view of the line between a reasonable legal 
 
 84. The IG’s office focuses on issues arising from “waste, fraud, abuse, misconduct, or 
whistleblower reprisal relating to a Department of Justice (DOJ) employee, program, contract, 
or grant.” Hotline, OFF. INSPECTOR GEN., https://oig.justice.gov/hotline/index.htm 
[https://perma.cc/5B3X-QRSX] (last visited Mar. 15, 2019). 
 85. Bringing attention to noncompliance with the rules of professional conduct is a form 
of whistleblowing, but it is not necessarily considered “whistleblowing” under the law 
protecting employees from retaliation. See Kathleen Clark, White Paper on the Law of 
Whistleblowing 3 (2015) (unpublished manuscript), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/ 
papers.cfm?abstract_id=2176293&download=yes [http://perma.cc/T5GY-6GE7] (discussing 
the different ways law treats whistleblowing and concluding that the protections afforded are 
narrow). 
 86. OFFICE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY, REPORT:  INVESTIGATION INTO THE OFFICE OF 
LEGAL COUNSEL’S MEMORANDA CONCERNING ISSUES RELATING TO THE CENTRAL 
INTELLIGENCE AGENCY’S USE OF “ENHANCED INTERROGATION TECHNIQUES” ON SUSPECTED 
TERRORISTS 11, 251–54 (2009), http://www.hsdl.org/?abstract&did=28555/ [http://perma.cc/ 
QU65-W6BB]. 
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interpretation and one that was based on impermissible influence and policy-
driven bias.  However, the OPR’s report was ultimately not adopted.87 
Instead, the OPR’s report was subject to review by a more senior member 
of the DOJ, David Margolis, who rejected its findings.88  Margolis applied a 
standard that professional misconduct exists “when an attorney intentionally 
violates or acts in reckless disregard of a known, unambiguous obligation 
imposed by law, rule of professional conduct or department regulation or 
policy.”89  Margolis concluded that this was a closer question of law than the 
OPR thought, particularly given the exigent circumstances surrounding the 
memo’s importance.90 
F.  Lack of a Lawyer-Specific Culture 
Federal agencies are often defined by a specific ethos, an internal Kool-
Aid, that articulates their mission and approach.  For the DOJ, that Kool-Aid 
is infused with an independent conception of lawyering, forged in the fires 
of Watergate.  There, the language of commitment to objectivity and 
evenhandedness—and against bias—runs as a steady stream in official 
guidance, informal guidance,91 internal mentoring, and public statements.92  
The FBI views political interference as antithetical to the agency’s mission 
and a misuse of agency power.  Such institutional norms are strong enough 
to touch the appointment process, where candidates must justify their fitness 
in terms of commitments to objective and independent judgment.93  Such an 
environment provides a more fertile one to foster attorney independence. 
However, thousands of attorneys provide legal advice outside of the DOJ, 
and there the culture of the agency may be at odds with, silent on, or actively 
 
 87. Eric Lichtblau & Scott Shane, Report Faults 2 Authors of Bush Terror Memos, N.Y. 
TIMES (Feb. 19, 2010), https://www.nytimes.com/2010/02/20/us/politics/20justice.html 
[https://perma.cc/NF79-GHNZ]. 
 88. Id. 
 89. Memorandum from David Margolis, Assoc. Deputy Att’y Gen., Memorandum of 
Decision Regarding the Objections to the Findings of Professional Misconduct in the Office 
of Professional Responsibility’s Report of Investigation into the Office of Legal Counsel’s 
Memoranda Concerning Issues Relating to the Central Intelligence Agency’s Use of 
“Enhanced Interrogation Techniques” on Suspected Terrorists 11 (Jan. 5, 2010), 
https://fas.org/irp/agency/doj/opr-margolis.pdf [https://perma.cc/6WVB-XFF2]. 
 90. Id. at 10–11. 
 91. 110 CONG. REC. S6930 (daily ed. July 17, 2008) (statement of Sen. Leahy) (noting the 
FBI motto, “fidelity, bravery, and integrity”). 
 92. 110 CONG. REC. S6930–31 (daily ed. July 17, 2008) (statement of FBI Director Robert 
Mueller) (“The rule of law, civil liberties, and civil rights—these are not our burdens.  They 
are what make us better.  And they are what have made us better for the past 100 years.”). 
 93. Because of this public expectation for nonpartisan action, nominees for the Attorney 
General of the United States are often evaluated during confirmation hearings in terms of their 
commitment to objectivity and independence. Green & Roiphe, supra note 48, at 22.  But see 
Spaulding, supra note 1, at 1935 (“[T]here is the paradox that genuinely independent 
Attorneys General may be too independent to be trusted by an administration.  If that leads to 
their exclusion from the process of decision making on how to achieve critical administration 
goals, their advice will independent, to be sure, but also irrelevant.”). 
1956 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 87 
agnostic to the issue of the lawyer’s independent judgment.94  In these 
contexts, agencies impress on new employees, lawyers or not, the agency 
mission in slogans, swag, and substance.  For example, NASA’s mission is 
the “peaceful exploration of space,”95 while the National Labor Relations 
Board highlights its independent agency status and views its charge as 
“protect[ing] the rights of private sector employees to join together, with or 
without a union, to improve their wages and working conditions.”96  Each 
agency focuses on a substantive mission that may or may not value and foster 
lawyers’ autonomous judgment.  Even within law-oriented federal agencies, 
the duty to provide candid, informed advice may be muddied.  For example, 
in the Office of Legal Counsel, some have argued that it is an open question 
whether the function of that office is to provide “independent court-like 
advice” or “attorney’s advice to a client about what you can get away with 
and what you are allowed to do.”97 
Currently, there is nothing institutionalized into the federal administrative 
structure to tie lawyers across agencies together as a cohesive professional 
group.98  The lack of uniformity across administrative agencies prevents 
lawyers from forming alliances across departments that would allow them to 
solidify their professional identities, first as lawyers, and second as members 
of a given agency.  Thus, there is a stronger incentive to identify with intra-
agency, nonlawyer coworkers rather than lawyers who would understand the 
challenges and expectations of professional practice. 
It is important that lawyers maintain a professional legal culture, since 
laypeople often misunderstand the limits of advocacy, lawyer-client 
autonomy, and the lawyer’s duty of loyalty.  Loyalty in the vernacular is 
absolute:  to some, it means taking orders without asking questions or even 
pointing out inconsistencies.  This type of loyalty is incompatible with 
lawyering.  Even laying aside commitments to rendering candid advice, on a 
granular level duties of diligence and competence, coupled with 
communication, require lawyers to explore different options and then lay 
them out before a client.  It is well established that failure to do so, and 
thoroughly explain attendant risks, is professional misconduct subject to 
malpractice action.99 
 
 94. Federal Legal Employment Guide, PSJD, https://www.psjd.org/federal-legal-
employment-guide [https://perma.cc/TE96-4YA4] (last visited Mar. 15, 2019) (noting that 
there are 111,000 employees with law-related positions in executive and independent agencies 
alone, with 37,146 being general attorney positions). 
 95. NASA:  60 Years and Counting, NASA, https://www.nasa.gov/specials/60counting/ 
overview.html [https://perma.cc/GDB9-DNWD] (last visited Mar. 15, 2019). 
 96. Who We Are, NLRB, https://www.nlrb.gov/about-nlrb/who-we-are [https://perma.cc/ 
YV5C-WYPX] (last visited Mar. 15, 2019). 
 97. Memorandum from David Margolis, supra note 89, at 18 (quoting former Office of 
Legal Counsel Assistant Attorney General Jack Goldsmith). 
 98. While there is a Federal Bar Association, this group is voluntary and is independent 
from government sponsorship. FBA Mission and Vision, FED. B. ASS’N, 
http://www.fedbar.org/About-Us/FBA-Mission.aspx [https://perma.cc/JAK4-YPEG] (last 
visited Mar. 15, 2019). 
 99. See, e.g., Nichols v. Keller, 19 Cal. Rptr. 2d 601 (Ct. App. 1993) (finding that a lawyer 
committed malpractice where the client reasonably believed that the lawyer he consulted with 
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III.  SOLUTIONS 
Part III.A lays out ways in which agency relationships can be modified to 
better allow for lawyers’ professional independence.  Part III.B examines 
remedies to temper the influence of political appointees, while Part III.C 
proposes mechanisms to help hold supervisors accountable.  Finally, Part 
III.D advocates for a stronger lawyer-specific culture across agencies. 
A.  Nonlawyer Supervision:  Agency-Level Modifications 
Since the likelihood of having every administrative agency headed by a 
lawyer is low, alternatives to pure lawyer supervision provide the clearest 
path forward.  If immediate supervision by another lawyer is not possible or 
is politically infeasible, the creation of an independent administrative body 
charged with attorney oversight for all agencies would provide some 
insulation from administrative capture by nonlawyers.  While the academy 
has long extolled the virtues of an administrative agency taking on the self-
regulatory functions of bar organizations, creating one specifically for 
government lawyers may be more feasible in actuality.100  This is partially 
because a limited version of such an organization already exists within the 
Department of Justice:  the OPR. 
As noted above, the OPR functions by having lawyers regulate other 
lawyers’ conduct and does not extend to non-DOJ lawyers.101  The 
availability of OPR review in lieu of IG review, coupled with institutional 
norms discussed below, may in part explain why DOJ attorneys have been 
more willing to take public stances against the political pressure of the 
executive or agency heads:  they have more protection from pressures to 
compromise their legal judgment.  An expansive view of OPR-exclusive 
jurisdiction could provide an additional check for a nonlawyer supervisor.102 
 
would advise him on all available remedies following his workplace injury, but the lawyer 
only advised on workers compensation claims); Togstad v. Vesely, 291 N.W.2d 686 (Minn. 
1980) (finding a lawyer who declined representation to a person inquiring about a medical 
malpractice claim liable for legal malpractice because he was negligent in suggesting that the 
claim lacked merit). 
 100. See Martin Garbus & Joel Seligman, Sanctions and Disbarment:  They Sit in 
Judgment, in VERDICTS ON LAWYERS 47, 56–60 (Ralph Nader & Mark Green eds., 1976) 
(advocating the legislative creation of “an agency independent of the state and local bar 
associations” to govern lawyer discipline).  See generally David B. Wilkins, Who Should 
Regulate Lawyers?, 105 HARV. L REV. 799 (1992) (advocating for an independent 
administrative structure for regulating lawyer conduct). 
 101. Lest one is tempted to think this distinction between the politically appointed IG and 
the Office of Professional Responsibility is arcane or semantic, recent events indicate 
otherwise. See Manu Raju et al., Internal FBI Report Shows Discrepancy Between McCabe 
and Comey Accounts, CNN (Mar. 31, 2018), https://www.cnn.com/2018/03/30/politics/ 
mccabe-comey-fbi-report/index.html [https://perma.cc/8KQ3-6897]; Matt Zapotosky, FBI 
Disciplinary Office Recommends Firing Former Deputy Director Andrew McCabe, 
WASH. POST (Mar. 14, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/fbi-
disciplinary-office-recommends-firing-former-deputy-director-andrew-mccabe/2018/03/14/ 
c1d0dc1a-208a-11e8-86f6-54bfff693d2b_story.html [https://perma.cc/YN4F-QSLG]. 
 102. The ongoing status and scope of DOJ OPR’s power is an open question; however, so 
far, proposals would abrogate, rather than expand, the OPR’s power.  On June 6, 2018, a 
1958 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 87 
OPR findings themselves should also be infused with a stronger 
presumption of validity and should only be subject to deferential review by 
a group of the attorney’s professional peers.  This could be accomplished in 
several ways, including:  (1) setting the standard of review at the rational 
basis level; and (2) having the reviewing body be composed of lawyers drawn 
at random from the pool of government lawyer employees, who would be 
given time off from their other duties for their service.  Since the parties 
applying the deferential standard would be decidedly unpredictable, the 
ability to wield biased or partisan influence would be lessened. 
If a government attorney is subject to impermissible employment 
pressures, he or she could seek redress (ideally a confidential review) through 
the attorney-staffed OPR, rather than the generalized Merit Systems 
Protection Board.103 
Procedures that mandate record creation could also address the problem of 
rewarding principled insubordination with “cold turkey” assignments.  Such 
a system could require that, prior to reassigning any attorney to a different 
department or geographic locale, supervisors would need to submit a report 
for OPR review detailing the reasoning behind the personnel shift. 
If the IG structure is maintained, then the clear adoption of administrative 
regulations regarding lawyer-specific conduct requirements is key to creating 
a more autonomous environment.  The Inspector General Act defines 
protected whistleblowing to include reporting a violation of “any law, rule, 
or regulation.”104  Thus, clearer rules concerning what constitutes 
professional misconduct for lawyers and supervisory misconduct regarding 
undue interference (ideally adopted by agencies directly) would protect 
attorneys reporting up and allow them to act as their own watchdogs.105 
B.  Tempering Political Appointees 
The power and capriciousness of political appointees, often at the top of 
the agency hierarchy, require a combination of increased specificity in legal 
obligations coupled with diffusion of oversight power.  One way to achieve 
this is to broaden good-cause removal requirements in the administrative 
structure.  These good-cause removal provisions could incorporate violations 
of professional conduct standards into their determination of fitness, thereby 
incentivizing supervisors to act accordingly.  If one prefers the stick to the 
carrot, interference with lawyer professional independence could 
presumptively constitute good cause for removal.  Such a rule would remove 
 
Senate bill was introduced that would place such investigations squarely back under IG control 
and eliminate the existing exclusive powers of the OPR. S. 3003, 115th Cong. (2018). 
 103. This is the general semijudicial agency charged with processing mistreatment claims 
by federal civil servants. See supra Part II.A.2. 
 104. Whistleblower Protection Act of 1989, Pub. L. No. 101-12, § 3(a), 103 Stat. 16, 19 
(codified as amended at 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8)(A)(i) (2012)) (governing disclosures of 
illegality, waste, fraud, abuse, or public health or safety threats). 
 105. See, e.g., supra Part II.C.  As the McDade Amendment makes clear, agencies need to 
take affirmative action to make sure that their rules assure compliance with rules of 
professional conduct. 28 U.S.C. § 530B(b) (2012). 
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the ability of agencies to keep compromised parties in powerful positions 
while supporting underlings to upward report impermissible infringements 
on decision-making.  One could also clarify and strengthen mechanisms that 
allow agency lawyers to go directly to Congress in more extreme situations, 
a practice utilized during the Watergate era to circumvent the Attorney 
General’s review power.106 
The “special counsel” provisions of Title VI of the Ethics in Government 
Act of 1978, which were allowed to sunset in 1999, provide another 
thoughtful alternative to the current status quo.107  Under this Act, the 
“special counsel” attorneys were selected by a three-judge panel at the 
request of the Attorney General rather than by a single individual.108  In 
subsequent case law, the Supreme Court defended Congress’s ability to 
abrogate the Attorney General’s power in this way and found a federal 
statutory scheme that established certain special counsel outside of direct 
Attorney General control to be constitutional.109  Thus, using a multimember 
judicial panel or even a board in situations where allegations of impeding 
professional misconduct are in play might be a plausible way to insulate that 
party from hostile supervisory action. 
Forcing fact-finding and transparency can also help preserve the 
independence of government lawyers and protect them from adverse action.  
Former Attorney General Griffin Bell suggested (and his successor agreed) 
that disagreements between prosecutors and their supervisors should be 
memorialized in writing.110  One could also require that communications 
from the White House or Congress regarding specific cases be filtered 
through the Attorney General’s office.  Creating a clear path for attorneys to 
present fact-finding directly to Congress where they felt their supervisors 
were compromised could also give employees a venue to report “up and out” 
in the event of pervasive agency limitations.111 
C.  Increased Supervisor Accountability 
Creating institutional climates ripe for supervisor accountability requires a 
shift in oversight both in terms of detection and substance.  To detect and 
enforce, systems of investigative peer review can protect against supervisory 
abuses.  For example, IGs of the United States are subject to peer review by 
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other IG offices or a council of IGs gathered from different agencies.112  If 
agency heads were called to preside over the accountability of one another, 
it may have a positive impact on attorney oversight, provided that enough 
agency heads were sufficiently committed to the rule of law. 
Substantively, several rule reforms would, at minimum, add clarity and 
meaning to lawyer-supervisors’ obligations to safeguard professional 
independence.  The alchemy of disciplinary action between the bar and other 
coterminous forms of lawyer regulation is a fascinating and changeable plane 
where the efficacy of action, economic efficiency, and political viability all 
collide in a perfect (often inscrutable) storm.  As such, this Article will 
dispense with the obligatory suggestion that the state bar lead the charge to 
actively discipline lawyers who find themselves at the top of the federal 
hierarchy for failure to adhere to norms of rendering independent 
professional judgment.  While it takes no genius to see that political figures 
who are also attorneys, like Bill Clinton or Scott Pruitt, have violated lawyer 
codes of professional conduct and that bar associations would be resting on 
sure doctrinal footing in disciplining them as lawyers, the state bar as an 
entity appears to have enough of a self-preservation instinct to stay out of the 
tumult until the dust has settled—and then to cheerfully provide the 
exclamation point.113 
Rather, the state bar should be active by clarifying rules of professional 
conduct to place stronger limitations and responsibilities on supervisors.  The 
current rules hold supervisors accountable for the misdeeds of those they 
supervise in limited circumstances—predominately where they themselves 
order the action or have specific knowledge of the specific conduct at 
issue.114  Those supervised lack affirmative rights vis-à-vis the supervisor—
they are only entitled to “reasonable efforts to ensure that the firm has in 
effect measures giving reasonable assurance that the person’s conduct is 
compatible with the professional obligations of the lawyer.”115  There is no 
 
 112. 5 U.S.C. app. § 6(e)(7) (2002) (“[T]he exercise of the law enforcement powers by 
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provision for disciplining a supervisor directly for removing an attorney from 
a case or even discharging them for their insistence on compliance with 
professional rules.  The best possible fit for holding a supervisor accountable 
for such action is Model Rule 8.4(d), the catchall punishing a lawyer who 
“engage[s] in conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of justice.”116  
However, if one wants to preserve the professional independence of lawyers, 
then employment pressure is a real concern to be reckoned with.  Therefore, 
the bar should consider adopting a rule that, at minimum, parallels the 
common-law rule set forth in Wieder v. Skala,117 which protects at-will 
employees from being fired for complying with professional rules of 
conduct.118 
The mandatory reporting requirements under Model Rule 8.3 regarding 
“honesty, trustworthiness or fitness” should also be broadened to include 
improper supervisory action.119  This could be achieved by adding comments 
clarifying what “fitness” in the supervisory context entails.  A supervising 
attorney is unfit if he or she is using supervisory power to coerce lawyers 
against their own independent judgment.  Revising Rule 8.4’s reporting 
requirements shifts leverage between supervisor-lawyer and employee-
lawyer and creates an incentive for lawyers to report upward and participate 
in the oversight of supervisors.120  Model Rule 8.4 should also make clear 
that failure to cooperate and be forthcoming in the investigation of a 
supervisor is a form of action “prejudicial to the administration of justice.”121 
The state bar likewise would do well to clarify when professional rules 
apply to nontraditional lawyer practice.  There is a tendency to think of the 
context of the rules of professional responsibility as rules that govern 
litigation only, not rules that apply to nonlitigation settings.  This can be 
particularly problematic when many administrative entities are not 
employing lawyers as litigators but as policymakers, drafters, or adjudicators. 
By tightening up the expectations of supervisors and marrying them to 
employment concerns and the reporting requirements of all lawyers, the 
ABA would support a cultural shift in professional independence that would 
empower individual attorneys to fully engage with assessing a client’s goals 
and pursuing them using legal means. 
D.  Supporting a Lawyer-Specific Culture 
Establishing a lawyer culture begins with counting professional 
development activities as the equivalent of “billable” ones.  Ultimately, all 
the conferences or lawyer-oriented interactions in the world are meaningless 
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unless they are facilitated by the lawyer’s employer (here, the federal 
government).  This means not only allowing lawyers to participate in such 
professional development, but also deliberately creating time for such 
activities and casual lawyer interactions in day-to-day life (like a coffee break 
station). 
The military provides an extreme but useful example to examine conscious 
community building.  First, membership in the military comes with 
introduction to its principles and an absolute allegiance to those principles.  
Lawyer codes could be treated similarly, with a “legal boot camp” that all 
agency lawyers from different departments participate in at the outset of 
hiring.  Both attending and eventually running the boot camp would serve to 
create a “federal lawyer” ethos.  Given the DOJ’s existing successful culture 
of professional independence, perhaps an initial rotation through the DOJ for 
a period of one to two years would be advisable for eligibility to apply for 
lawyer positions elsewhere.122 
Second, the military spends extended amounts of time geographically 
isolated from nonmilitary personnel and sharing nonworking activities 
together (eating, sleeping, and generally living together).  While anyone 
could argue that sounds like being on a particularly heinous trial team, there 
is something to the misery-loves-company bonding mechanism (see 1L 
year).  During a “legal boot camp,” lawyers could also have geographic 
autonomy from nonlawyers and share regular interactions with one another. 
The continuation of these interactions once in the workplace is equally 
important to maintain cohesiveness.  Labor norms, including lack of 
scheduled breaks and lunch times, contribute to a failure to build an ethic of 
independence among lawyers.  Eating together is an important factor in 
building affinities.  Thinking through how to maintain meal interactions and 
create physical separation and autonomy within a building, or by lawyers 
being housed in their own federal building, sends a strong signal of social 
unity.  Rather than lawyers working within different agency-specific 
buildings, the agencies could create a law-office setting where lawyers from 
all different agencies work side by side.  It would signal to the public, the 
agencies, and lawyers themselves that they are lawyers first.  Building daily 
time into the work structure for lawyer interaction solidifies commitments to 
lawyerly values.  Another option could rotate federal government lawyers in 
and out of different agency positions as a matter of course, with term-limited 
assignments in each office.123  While this might weaken some agency-
specific institutional memory, it would accomplish more than buttressing 
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lawyer solidarity; each agency lawyer would have deeper comparative 
knowledge and a better understanding of sister agencies and their challenges. 
However, one need not adopt such grand-scale reforms. The IGs from all 
agencies have an annual national conference where they reconnect and share 
common challenges and problems.  Federal lawyers could do this, too.  
Creating physical spaces for lawyers, even as simple as grouping them all on 
the same floor in a single building, would be useful.  Encouraging meal 
interactions could be as straightforward as making clear the labor norms:  
“Everyone is expected to be here from eight to five, with a one-hour lunch 
from noon to one.”  If all agencies have approximately the same lunch time, 
then organic connections between parties can continue and grow from the 
annual meetings. 
A cross agency legal community allows lawyers to access a network of 
attorneys who are not subject to the same direct employment pressures and 
to reaffirm normative professional commitments.  If we accept as a goal that 
we want lawyers to identify as lawyers first and agency-specific employees 
second, then institutions must be crafted to instill, cultivate, and nourish a 
lawyer-specific culture that values independent judgment. 
Finally, engaging with public expectations regarding government lawyers 
is an important part of institutional redesign.  The public’s view of how 
important it is for lawyers to maintain their independence steels the nerves of 
and drives confirmation processes for political appointees.124  The public 
doesn’t like a Justice Department head who is not independent—such a DOJ 
would be viewed as having compromised governance.  This supports the 
FBI’s conception of professional independence.  Here, a charm offensive 
might be in order to make clear that not just DOJ lawyers oversee protecting 
the public from political abuses of power and to demonstrate that all lawyers 
must independently tell their superiors the hard facts about the legal 
parameters of their choices.  This is not an obstructionist tendency—this is 
the slowness that the law, properly executed, requires. 
CONCLUSION 
This Article began with the goal of outlining the importance of 
independent professional judgment in the context of federal administrative 
practice, where the federal government’s power can overwhelm not only 
individual citizens, but also cities, municipalities, and even states.  The stakes 
pinned on lawyers being willing and able to provide candid advice about the 
law are high. 
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Yet, while lawyers are charged with this task professionally, they are put 
in the position where they must meet their professional obligations at the risk 
of sacrificing their own livelihood and personal needs.  This burden is too 
great.  If we want lawyers to act independently, then we must provide them 
with an institutional environment where such action is the path of least 
resistance.  Justice Joseph Story once said:  “The lawyer is placed, as it were, 
upon the outpost of defence, as a public sentinel, to watch the approach of 
danger, and to sound the alarm, when oppression is at hand.”125  One cannot 
be a sentinel with no post from which to see and with no alarm to sound.  
Turns out, Uncle Sam’s lawyers could do better if they had more than a stool 
and a whistle. 
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